Game Theory I (2015 Summer)

Instructor: Akira Okada, Department of Economics

Course Summary

This course presents game theory at a graduate level with special emphasis of non-cooperative game theory. Students are encouraged to learn formulations of game models, definitions of concepts, and mathematical proofs of fundamental theorems. Economic applications are also explained. The following topics are covered.
(1) games in strategic form: pure and mixed strategies, best response, Nash equilibrium, Fixed-point theorems, voluntary contribution games
(2) games in extensive form: information sets, behavior strategies, Kuhn theorem, backward induction
(3) refinements of Nash equilibrium: subgame perfect equilibrium, sequential equilibrium, perfect equilibrium
(4) games with incomplete information: Harsanyi transformation, Bayesian Nash equilibrium, signaling games
(5) repeated games: trigger strategy, folk theorem

Grade

Students are evaluated by mid-term examination (50 points), final examination (50 points) with Grade A (80-100), Grade B (70-79), Grade C (60-69), Grade D (50-59) and Grade F (failed) (below 49).

References

1.Okada, A., Game Theory (in Japanese), Yuhikaku, 2011 (1996 first edition).
2.Osborne, M. and A. Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory, MIT Press, 1996.
3.Vega-Redondo, F., Economics and the Theory of Games, Cambridge University Press, 2003.
4.Mas-Colell, A., M. D. Whinston, and J. R. Green, Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press, 1993.
5.Okada, A., Mathematics for Economics and Management Sciences (in Japanese), Toyo-Keizai, 2001.