Akira Okada

Office

Graduate School of Economics
Hitotsubashi University
2-1 Naka, Kunitachi 186-8601
Japan
Phone: +81 42 580 8599
Fax : +81 42 580 8748
E-mail: aokada"at"econ.hit-u.ac.jp

Research interests

Game Theory, Bargaining Theory, Experimental Economics, Cooperation and Conflict

Recent works and selected publications

Discussion papers
Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University

"Group Formation and Heterogeneity in Collective Action Games,"
(with Toshimasa Maruta), #2005-7, 2005.

"Stochastically Stable Equilibria in Coordination Games with Multiple Populations,"
(with Toshimasa Maruta), #2009-1, 2009.

"The Stationary Equilibrium of Three-Person Cooperative Games: A Classification,"
#2012-6, 2012.

Bargaining Theory

"A Noncooperative Approach to the Nash Bargaining Problem,"
In R. Selten(ed.) Game Equilibrium Models III - Strategic Bargaining,
Springer-Verlag, 1991, 7-34.

"Noncooperative Bargaining and the Core of an n-Person CharacteristicFunction Game,"
Control and Cybernetics 21, 1992, 231 - 250.

"A Noncooperative Coalitional Bargaining Game with Random Proposers,"
Games and Economic Behavior 16, 1996, 97-108.

"The Efficiency Principle in Non-cooperative Coalitional Bargaining,"
Japanese Economic Review 51, 2000, 34-50.

"A Noncooperative Axiomatization of the Core" (with Eyal Winter),
Theory and Decision 53(1), 2003, 1-28.

"Inefficiency and Social Exclusion in a Coalition Formation Game: Experimental Evidence"
(with Arno Riedl), Games and Economic Behavior 50, 2005, 278-311.

"Riskless versus Risky Bargaining Procedures: The Aumann-Roth Controversy Revisited"
(with Maria Montero), Japanese Economic Review 58, 2007, 294-302.

"The Nash Bargaining Solution in General n-Person Cooperative Games,"
Journal of Economic Theory 145, 2010, 2356-2379.

"Coalitional Bargaining Games with Random Proposers: Theory and Application,"
Games and Economic Behavior 73, 2011, 227-235.

"Non-cooperative Bargaining and the Incomplete Informational Core,"
Journal of Economic Theory 147, 2012, 1165-1190.

Cooperation and Conflict

"The Possibility of Cooperation in an n-Person Prisoners' Dilemma with Institutional Arrangements,"
Public Choice 77, 1993, 629-656.

"The Organization of Social Cooperation: A Noncooperative Approach,"
In W. Gueth et al. (eds.), Understanding Strategic Interaction - Essays
in Honor of Reinhard Selten, Springer-Verlag, 1996, 228-242.

"The Dynamic Transformation of Political Systems through Social Contract:A Game Theoretic Approach" (with Kenichi Sakakibara and Koichi Suga),
Social Choice and Welfare, 14, 1997, 1-21.

"The Second-Order Dilemma of Public Goods and Capital Accumulation,"
Public Choice 135, 2008, 165-182.

"Institution Formation in Public Goods Games"(with Michael Kosfeld and
Arno Riedl), American Economic Review 99, 1335-55, 2009.

“Dynamic Group Formation in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma,” (with Toshimasa Maruta),
Games and Economic Behavior, 74, 2012, 269-284.

Foundations of Non-cooperative Game Theory

"On Stability of Perfect Equilibrium Points,"
International Journal of Game Theory 10, 1981, 67-73.

"A Note on the Perfectness Concept and the Information Structures of Games,"
International Journal of Game Theory 10, 1981, 133-136.

"Strictly Perfect Equilibrium Points of Bimatrix Games,"
International Journal of Game Theory 13, 1984, 145-154.

"Strongly Stable Equilibrium Points of N-Person Noncooperative Games,"
(with Masakazu Kojima and Susumu Shindoh), Mathematics of Operations
Research 10, 1985, 650-663.

"Complete Inflation and Perfect Recall in Extensive Games,"
International Journal of Game Theory 16, 1987, 85-91.

"Perfect Equilibrium Points and Lexicographic Domination,"
International Journal of Game Theory 17, 1988, 225-239.

"Lexicographic Domination in Extensive Games,"
International Journal of Game Theory 20, 1991, 95-108.