Akira Okada



Graduate School of Economics
Hitotsubashi University
2-1 Naka, Kunitachi 186-8601
E-mail: aokada"at"econ.hit-u.ac.jp

Research interests

Game Theory, Bargaining Theory, Experimental Economics, Cooperation and Conflict

Recent works and selected publications

Discussion papers
Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University

"A Non-cooperative Bargaining Theory with Incomplete Information: Verifiable Types,"
DP #2013-15, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University,2013.

"Cooperation and Institution in Games,"
DP #2014-11, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University, 2014.

Bargaining Theory

"A Noncooperative Approach to the Nash Bargaining Problem,"
In R. Selten(ed.) Game Equilibrium Models III - Strategic Bargaining,
Springer-Verlag, 1991, 7-34.

"Noncooperative Bargaining and the Core of an n-Person CharacteristicFunction Game,"
Control and Cybernetics 21, 1992, 231 - 250.

"A Noncooperative Coalitional Bargaining Game with Random Proposers,"
Games and Economic Behavior 16, 1996, 97-108.

"The Efficiency Principle in Non-cooperative Coalitional Bargaining,"
Japanese Economic Review 51, 2000, 34-50.

"A Noncooperative Axiomatization of the Core" (with Eyal Winter),
Theory and Decision 53(1), 2003, 1-28.

"Inefficiency and Social Exclusion in a Coalition Formation Game: Experimental Evidence"
(with Arno Riedl), Games and Economic Behavior 50, 2005, 278-311.

"Riskless versus Risky Bargaining Procedures: The Aumann-Roth Controversy Revisited"
(with Maria Montero), Japanese Economic Review 58, 2007, 294-302.

"The Nash Bargaining Solution in General n-Person Cooperative Games,"
Journal of Economic Theory 145, 2010, 2356-2379.

"Coalitional Bargaining Games with Random Proposers: Theory and Application,"
Games and Economic Behavior 73, 2011, 227-235.

"Non-cooperative Bargaining and the Incomplete Informational Core,"
Journal of Economic Theory 147, 2012, 1165-1190.

"The Stationary Equilibrium of Three-Person Cooperative Games: A Classification,"
forthcoming in International Journal of Game Theory.

Cooperation and Conflict

"The Possibility of Cooperation in an n-Person Prisoners' Dilemma with Institutional Arrangements,"
Public Choice 77, 1993, 629-656.

"The Organization of Social Cooperation: A Noncooperative Approach,"
In W. Gueth et al. (eds.), Understanding Strategic Interaction - Essays
in Honor of Reinhard Selten, Springer-Verlag, 1996, 228-242.

"The Dynamic Transformation of Political Systems through Social Contract:A Game Theoretic Approach" (with Kenichi Sakakibara and Koichi Suga),
Social Choice and Welfare, 14, 1997, 1-21.

"The Second-Order Dilemma of Public Goods and Capital Accumulation,"
Public Choice 135, 2008, 165-182.

"Institution Formation in Public Goods Games"(with Michael Kosfeld and
Arno Riedl), American Economic Review 99, 1335-55, 2009.

"Dynamic Group Formation in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma," (with Toshimasa Maruta),
Games and Economic Behavior, 74, 2012, 269-284.

"The Formation and Long-run Stability of Cooperative Groups in a Social Dilemma Situation" (with Toshimasa Maruta),
forthcoming in International Journal of Economic Theory.

Foundations of Non-cooperative Game Theory

"On Stability of Perfect Equilibrium Points,"
International Journal of Game Theory 10, 1981, 67-73.

"A Note on the Perfectness Concept and the Information Structures of Games,"
International Journal of Game Theory 10, 1981, 133-136.

"Strictly Perfect Equilibrium Points of Bimatrix Games,"
International Journal of Game Theory 13, 1984, 145-154.

"Strongly Stable Equilibrium Points of N-Person Noncooperative Games,"
(with Masakazu Kojima and Susumu Shindoh), Mathematics of Operations
Research 10, 1985, 650-663.

"Complete Inflation and Perfect Recall in Extensive Games,"
International Journal of Game Theory 16, 1987, 85-91.

"Perfect Equilibrium Points and Lexicographic Domination,"
International Journal of Game Theory 17, 1988, 225-239.

"Lexicographic Domination in Extensive Games,"
International Journal of Game Theory 20, 1991, 95-108.